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LAWS, PLANS AND INTELLIGIBILITY: DEFENDING LEGAL 
POSITIVISM  
Lee Jing Yan* 
Abstract: The debate between legal positivists and antipositivists has progressed to new 
points of contention. In recent years, a new positivistic theory of law has been put forth 
by Scott J. Shapiro, called ‘The Planning Theory of Law’. This paper aims to 
demonstrate how the Planning Theory is able to withstand a powerful antipositivistic 
objection by Mark Greenberg that social facts, by themselves, are incapable of 
grounding legal facts in an intelligible manner. Building on David Plunkett’s reply to 
Mark Greenberg in ‘A Positivist Route for Explaining How Facts Make Law’ (2012), 
this paper demonstrates how conceptual facts provided to us by the Planning Theory 
are able to account for the intelligible and reason-based manner in which social facts 
ground legal facts, thereby creating law without appealing to value facts or morality. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A central debate in the philosophy of law for decades has been whether the existence 
of law is determined simply by social (or descriptive) facts, or necessarily by value 
(moral) facts1 also. Philosophers of law have accordingly divided into legal positivists 
and legal antipositivists respectively. Names like H.L.A Hart and Ronald Dworkin 
famously dominated the debate, but in the last decade the arguments have progressed 
and the positions sophisticated. 
It is into this new phase of debate that this paper enters. Two recent 
developments are relevant for our purposes. The first is a philosophically novel 
objection to legal positivism by Mark Greenberg2 arguing that social facts alone cannot 
account for the intelligibility of law, that is, the reason-based relationship between legal 
facts and their determinant facts, since social facts cannot by themselves explain their 
own relevance in determining law.  
The second relevant development is a fresh account of the nature of law by 
Professor Scott J. Shapiro, called the ‘Planning Theory of Law’ (henceforth ‘the 
Planning Theory’).3 Although firmly positivistic, the account departs in many ways 
from Hart’s ‘laws as rules’ theory of law.4 
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In this paper, my thesis is that the Planning Theory, properly framed, can answer 
Greenberg’s challenge and account for the intelligibility of law. Building on David 
Plunkett’s Reply to Greenberg,5 I will argue that conceptual facts about law can explain 
the relevance of social facts to determining legal facts and in a way that is equally able 
to account for our intuitions about legal reasoning that Greenberg appeals to. My 
strategy is thus to concede Greenberg’s observations about the reason-based 
relationship between legal facts and its determinant facts (what he terms the ‘rational-
relation doctrine’), but to deny that it is a reason to reject legal positivism, since 
positivists have an equally plausible way of accounting for the intelligibility of law 
without appealing to value facts. Further, in demonstrating how an appeal to conceptual 
facts allows the positivist to meet Greenberg’s challenge, I hope to draw attention to an 
interesting connection between the epistemological question of how we know legal 
facts and the metaphysical question of how legal facts are determined. 
 
B. THE PLANNING THEORY AND THE ARGUMENT FROM 
INTELLIGIBILITY 
In this Part, I set out the context of the debate within which my argument in this paper 
is advanced: Shapiro’s constitutive account of law in the form of the Planning Theory, 
and Greenberg’s argument from intelligibility – that there is a reason-based relationship 
between legal facts and their determinant facts which is problematic for legal 
positivists. 
1. The Planning Theory 
The central claim of the Planning Theory is that legal activity is a form of social 
planning.6 Legal institutions and, by extension, legal systems, are instances of 
organisations of social planning,7 and legal norms are just the set of plans or planlike 
norms produced by legal institutions.8  
What are plans? Plans are positive, purposive entities that aim to settle 
deliberative questions about what is to be done and so guide conduct over time to 
achieve goals set by the planners.9 They are positive entities in that they are created and 
sustained by rational agents, unlike the norms of morality which are (on some accounts) 
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naturally-occurring. They are also purposive in that they are not just created norms, but 
created to be norms. Plans also settle deliberative questions about what to do. Human 
beings do not have the cognitive resources to think about every single decision there is 
to make at every moment of every day. The deliberative costs would be too high. 
Therefore, to reduce those costs we create and apply plans. Plans also guide conduct 
over time by placing normative pressure on a person who accepts the plan to follow it, 
or at least not disregard it without weighty reasons. This pressure comes from the 
principle of instrumental rationality: once I have intended the ends, I must rationally 
also intend the means.  
An important feature of plans is that they can be shared, in that they can be 
created to be applied to a group of people who may not include the planners. However, 
the subjects of the plan need not have the same mental state as the planner for it to be 
accepted by all. Where plans involve many people, widespread alienation can occur 
without negating the existence of a plan. For example, in a large company, the Chief 
Executive Officer comes up with a master plan for the whole corporation, with sub-
plans and tasks for each department and individual. He does so because he aims to 
improve the long-term prospects of the company. However, the majority of his 
employees may in fact have no interest in the success of the company and thus be 
alienated from their jobs. Nevertheless, they may accept their roles in the plan and do 
what they are instructed. 
 Shapiro’s key move is to see legal institutions as instances of social planning: 
According to what I will call the “Planning Theory of Law,” legal systems are 
institutions of social planning and their fundamental aim is to compensate for 
the deficiencies of alternative forms of planning in the circumstances of legality. 
Legal institutions are supposed to enable communities to overcome the 
complexity, contentiousness, and arbitrariness of communal life by resolving 
those social problems that cannot be solved, or solved as well, by nonlegal 
means alone.10  
Therefore, if legal institutions are social planning organisations, then legal 
norms are just the set of plans or planlike norms created by the activity of such 
organisations.11   
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Crucially, Shapiro’s account of plans as positive entities guarantees the 
positivity of his account of legal norms.12 Under the Planning Theory, the existence of 
a legal norm, just like the existence of a plan, is never determined by reference to value 
facts, but social facts alone.13 For Shapiro, plan positivism leads to legal positivism, 
which makes it potentially vulnerable to Greenberg’s argument from intelligibility, to 
which I now turn. 
2. The Intelligibility of Law 
Greenberg begins with premises that are uncontroversial as between positivists and 
antipositivists. 
First, in any legal system there is a substantial body of determinate legal content, 
meaning to say that there are many true legal facts in that system; a legal fact being any 
true legal norm.14 
Second, these legal facts are not ontologically primitive; they do not exist as 
basic facts about the universe. It is not a natural law of the universe that it is illegal to 
drive faster than 50km/h on city roads. Rather, legal facts are themselves determined 
by more basic facts.15 
Third, among these basic facts are social facts, that is, descriptive facts about 
what was said and done by individuals. These social facts include anything that was 
said and done by legal officials, such as legislation, judgments, executive orders, etc.16 
 Greenberg then begins his challenge by asking, ‘what is the relationship 
between these social facts and legal facts?’17 It is uncontroversial that the relationship 
is at least metaphysical, in that legal facts, to an extent, consist in social facts. What we 
say and do in Parliament, as judges or executives, to some extent makes up the legal 
facts of the system.  
However, is the relationship between legal facts and social facts brute 
metaphysical, such that the social facts entail the legal facts without anything further? 
An example of a brute metaphysical relationship is the relationship between the 
chemical composition of water and the physical phenomenon of water itself. Whether 
something is water is simply a question of whether its chemical composition is H2O. 
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Once an object’s chemical composition is H2O, it just is water, without further reasons 
why H2O should be water. 
A brute metaphysical relationship runs counter to our intuitions about the 
process of legal reasoning.18 The only access that we have to legal facts is through our 
social facts. For example, I cannot simply discover by meditation the principles of 
contract law; rather, I have to look at what was said and done by Parliament in 
legislation and judges in case law to know what the law is. However, if the relationship 
between social and legal facts were brute metaphysical and not reason-based, even after 
looking at legislation and case law, I still would not be able to tell what the law is, 
because I would not know how to extrapolate from the mass of social facts before me 
to arrive at determinate legal facts about contract law. 
Reason-based extrapolation from social facts is evident in daily legal practice. 
When judges interpret statutes, they write lengthy judgments justifying their 
interpretations. When lawyers argue in court, they do not simply submit a list of cases 
to the judge; they seek to justify on the basis of reasons why previous cases support 
certain legal propositions and not others. It is implicit in our legal practice and discourse 
that social facts and legal facts relate in a reason-based way. A certain set of social facts 
support a certain set of legal facts over others on the basis of reasons. Without reasons, 
the law would simply be indeterminate, because the process of arriving at legal facts 
from social facts would be opaque and unintelligible.  
Further, we would be unable to understand the effect that a change in social 
facts would have on the law of the system. Suppose that we have a certain set of social 
facts A and we know that social facts A results in legal facts B. Now suppose that there 
was a change in social facts A, and we are asked, ‘how do legal facts B change?’ If the 
relationship between social and legal facts were brute metaphysical and not based on 
reasons, then we could not answer the question. For example, we would have no idea 
whether the deletion of a single word ‘the’ in a constitution would have no legal effect, 
or invalidate a single legal doctrine, or invalidate the entirety of constitutional law in 
the system.  
Therefore, the relationship between legal facts and social facts cannot be brute 
metaphysical; it must be reason-based. This is what is meant by ‘intelligibility’, which 
Greenberg also calls the ‘rational-relation doctrine’.19 Rational agents must be able to 
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understand why a certain set of determinants of legal facts (such as social facts) results 
in one set of legal facts and not another.20 There must be reasons why deleting a single 
word ‘the’ from a constitution has the effect that it has on the law. We may not agree 
what the effect is, but we agree that there is a correct answer, and that the answer is 
correct because of reasons. To be clear, Greenberg is not making the claim that the 
content of the law must be rationally intelligible, but rather the relationship between 
determinant social facts and legal facts must be rationally intelligible.21 
3. The Problem for Positivists 
Having set out this requirement of intelligibility, Greenberg then argues that social facts 
alone cannot explain law, because they cannot provide the reasons for their own 
contribution to legal facts.22 This is essentially a version of Hume’s law: in the same 
way that descriptive facts about the universe cannot by themselves provide reasons for 
normative conclusions, social facts by themselves cannot provide reasons for claiming 
that one set of legal facts is correct instead of another.23 
Certainly, there are some social facts that purport to determine how other social 
facts determine legal facts. For example, it might be written in a constitution that ‘only 
the speeches of a majority in the Supreme Court shall determine the law’. However, in 
order to decide what, according to that constitution, is the contribution of Supreme 
Court judgments to the law, we must first decide what that constitution’s own 
contribution to the law is. Essentially, we cannot appeal to social facts B to determine 
the legal effect of social facts A without first asking what the legal effect of social facts 
B is. 
Further, even if a constitution purported to determine its own contribution to the 
law, perhaps with the statement ‘this Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land’, 
we must still decide how that particular statement contributes to the law. And if one 
were to point to another set of social facts to explain that contribution, then we have to 
first decide what this other set of social facts’ legal contribution is, ad infinitum. This 
holds even if the relevant social facts are what was said and done by legal officials; one 
must first decide how and why speeches in Parliament, in the courts, in government, 
are relevant to determining the law, and so on and so forth. Indeed, one must first settle 
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the preliminary question of what counts as a legal practice that is relevant to 
determining legal content, as opposed to mere social practices that are irrelevant.   
Greenberg’s point is this: social facts cannot, without begging the question, 
determine their own role and relevance to determining legal facts. They are normatively 
inert; they cannot be a basic source of reasons. Thus, if social facts relate to legal facts 
in a reason-based way, and social facts cannot provide those reasons, then social facts 
cannot be the only necessary determinants of legal facts. Something else besides social 
facts must be the source of reasons that explain the intelligibility of law.  
Greenberg suggests that there are two possible candidates that could fulfil the 
role of intelligibility-enabling facts – conceptual facts and value facts.24 (Value facts 
being, as defined in my introduction, genuine moral facts, and conceptual facts being 
facts about concepts which are constituent components of our thoughts – I will expand 
on this below). However, Greenberg believes that value facts are a much stronger 
candidate than conceptual facts for successfully satisfying the rational-relation 
doctrine.25 Therefore, according to Greenberg, this is a reason to reject legal positivism. 
 
C. THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF PLANS 
In this Part, I advance my substantive argument in this paper. First, I set out a basic 
understanding of concepts and conceptual facts. Second, I show that the constitutive 
account of law in the form of the Planning Theory is a result of conceptual analysis that 
therefore gives us access to certain conceptual facts about law. Finally, I demonstrate 
how exactly those conceptual facts enable the intelligible, reason-based relationship 
between social facts and legal facts that allows the positivist to satisfy the rational-
relation doctrine.  
As mentioned above, my broad strategy will be to grant Greenberg’s 
observations about the reason-based relationship between legal facts and social facts, 
but to demonstrate, building on Plunkett’s work, that conceptual facts, as opposed to 
value facts, are just as capable of satisfying the rational-relation doctrine, and in fact do 
so in a way that equally accounts for our intuitions about law and legal reasoning that 
Greenberg appealed to. 
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1. Concepts and Conceptual Facts 
It is helpful to understand concepts in their everyday context.26 Concepts are the 
constituent component of our thoughts that our words aim to express. When we use 
words like ‘water’ or ‘cat’ to refer to things in the world, we are applying our concepts 
[WATER]27 and [CAT]. Given this relationship between concepts and language, the 
way we find out more about our concepts is by examining our word usage. If you and I 
use the words ‘water’ and ‘cat’ in the same instances, then to that extent we have shared 
concepts of [WATER] and [CAT]. 
As we examine the instances in which we use the word ‘cat’, we discover 
common properties in the objects that must obtain if they are to fall under our concept 
of [CAT] and thus be correctly labelled ‘cat’. Such properties might include being a 
mammal, having four legs, having a tail etc. This process of examining our instances 
of word-usage in order to determine those properties is called conceptual analysis.28 
Note that we do not actually have to present physical objects to rational agents to 
examine their word usage. Conceptual analysis can also happen by way of 
hypotheticals. Chalmers and Jackson note this in their summary of conceptual analysis:  
Analysis of a concept proceeds at least in part through consideration of a 
concept's extension within hypothetical scenarios, and noting regularities that 
emerge. This sort of analysis can reveal that certain features of the world are 
highly relevant to determining the extension of a concept, and that other features 
are irrelevant. What emerges as a result of this process may or may not be an 
explicit definition, but it will at least give useful information about the features 
in virtue of which a concept applies to the world.29 
Conceptual analysis helps uncover the essential properties of an object X that 
determine whether it falls under a given concept. These essential properties are 
conceptual facts about the concept. Suppose we discover through conceptual analysis 
that in order for some animal to fall under our concept of [WHALE] it must be a 
mammal, since it is that which distinguishes it from [FISH]. If that is true, then it is a 
conceptual fact that whales are mammals. This means that if I possess the concept 
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[WHALE], then I can reason that, should I encounter a hypothetical animal X, if X falls 
under my concept of [WHALE] then X is also a mammal. This also illustrates another 
feature of conceptual facts, for it is not just that the hypothetical animal X is a mammal, 
but that it also falls under my concept of [MAMMAL]. If X falls under [WHALE] then 
it also falls under [MAMMAL]. Conceptual facts, in this sense, link claims in different 
vocabularies together.30 
To see this clearly, take the concept [HETEROCHROMIA].31 If someone 
possesses the concept [HETEROCHROMIA], she understands what must obtain in 
order for someone to have heterochromia. She therefore understands the conceptual fact 
that if a certain chemical composition of genes obtains in a human being, a phenomenal 
observation obtains, in this case, mismatched eyes. This conceptual fact thus allows her 
to link a claim in biochemistry ‘John has genotype XYZ’ with the phenomenal 
observation ‘John has mismatched eyes’. Conceptual facts tell us that there is a 
relationship between facts in different domains. 
Further, conceptual facts not only tell us that there is a relationship between 
facts in different domains, but they can also tell us something about why there is a 
relationship between those facts.32 Returning to my heterochromia example, suppose 
that at primary school my only understanding of [HETEROCHROMIA] was that 
people with mismatched eyes fell under that concept. I did not know why that was the 
case, but I knew there was something in the underlying nature of such people that 
caused them to have mismatched eyes. It is only later in secondary school that I learnt 
that mismatched eyes are caused by a certain sequence of genes, and maybe only in 
university do I understand the processes involved in genetic expression. What has 
happened is that through empirical investigation I have deepened my understanding of 
heterochromia as a physical phenomenon, and therefore my understanding of the 
concept of [HETEROCHROMIA], to tell me something of why such a relationship 
exists between a claim in biochemistry and the phenomonal observation of mismatched 
eyes. 
To summarise, a rational subject who possesses a given concept understands the 
properties that must obtain in order for something in the world to fall under that concept. 
These essential properties are uncovered through conceptual analysis, involving an 
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examination of our word usage. These essential properties constitute conceptual facts 
that are able to relate claims in different vocabularies with each other and illuminate 
something about that relationship. 
2. Conceptual Facts from the Planning Theory 
Given this basic account of concepts, can we view Shapiro’s project in Legality as 
conceptual analysis giving us access to conceptual facts about law? The starting point 
must be that Shapiro considers himself to be undertaking conceptual analysis. 
Throughout the book he addresses two big questions about law: the Identity Question 
and the Implication Question. 
The Identity Question ‘is to ask what it is about X that makes it X and not Y or 
Z or any other such thing. … A correct answer to the Identity Question must supply the 
set of properties that make (possible or actual) instances of X the things that they are. 
The identity of water, to take another example, is H2O because water is just H2O. Being 
H2O is what makes water water.’33 In this sense, Shapiro aims to give an account of the 
properties of law that make it law in the same way that H2O makes water water.  
In asking the Implication Question, ‘we are not so much interested in what 
makes the object the thing that it is but rather in what necessarily follows from the fact 
that it is what it is and not something else. … to take a trivial finding, mathematicians 
have discovered that 3 is a prime number. While being a prime number is not part of 
number 3’s identity (being the successor of 2 is), we might still say that it is part of the 
nature of 3 because being 3 necessarily entails being prime.’34 In this sense, Shapiro 
aims to uncover law’s necessary properties, the properties that it ‘could not fail to 
have’.35 In asking these two questions about law, therefore, Shapiro sees himself as 
undertaking a quintessentially conceptual analysis of law: ‘Analytical philosophers 
have traditionally approached both identity and implication questions by means of a 
distinctive methodology. … I will refer to it here as conceptual analysis.’36 
This is also borne out by his methodology: ‘The key to conceptual analysis, 
then, is the gathering of truisms about a given entity’.37 The data that Shapiro collects 
for his analysis consists of truisms, defined as ‘those truths that those who have a good 
understanding of how legal institutions operate (lawyers, judges, legislators, legal 
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scholars, and so on) take to be self-evident, or at least would take to be so on due 
reflection.’38 Many of these truisms would be based on intuitions about law, which 
Shapiro sees as having a provisional role to play in conceptual analysis.39 Essentially, 
Shapiro proceeds by examining our intuitions about when and whether we identify 
something as law in a hypothetical scenario. If our intuitions lead us to identify a judge’s 
written speech as law, but not the Prime Minister’s speech, then those intuitions hint at 
a potential property of law. Indeed, chapters 5 and 6 of Legality aim to draw on our 
intuitions about when something counts as law. There, Shapiro builds a very complex 
planning system from a very simple case of a shared plan to cook dinner together, 
hoping that by the end we would intuitively identify that planning organisation as a 
legal system, or at least, see intuitive similarities between complex planning 
organisations and legal systems. Of course, intuitions can be flawed, and it is the point 
of a theory to correct them, which is why they only play a provisional role. Conceptual 
analysis aims to identify the sources of conflict between our intuitions and rationally 
resolve them, which necessarily requires correcting them.40 
It is therefore reasonable to claim that Shapiro is undertaking the kind of 
conceptual analysis described in the previous section. Shapiro examines our intuitions 
about when and whether we would call something ‘law’ in order to uncover the 
properties that constitute our concept of law. To the extent that this methodology 
characterises his project in Legality, it delivers conceptual facts about law. 
3. The Intelligibility-Enabling Role of Conceptual Facts 
We must now examine whether these conceptual facts, delivered to us by the Planning 
Theory, can illuminate the reason-based relationship between legal facts and social 
facts that the rational-relation doctrine requires. In order to do so, we must first be clear 
on what these conceptual facts are. We can derive the following conceptual facts from 
the theses of the Planning Theory set out in Part B above: 
(1) The legal facts (norms) of a system are just the set of plans created and 
applied by legal institutions. 
(2) Plans are positive, purposive entities that aim to settle deliberative questions 
about what is to be done and so guide conduct over time to achieve goals 
set by the planners. 
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(3) Combining (1) and (2), legal facts are positive, purposive entities that aim 
to settle deliberative questions about what is to be done and so guide 
conduct over time to achieve goals set by the system’s planners. 
How do these conceptual facts account for law’s intelligibility? In the previous 
section, we saw that conceptual facts relate claims in different domains. 
[HETEROCHROMIA], for example, relates facts in biochemistry with phenomenal 
observations. Similarly, once a subject possesses the concept [LEGAL 
INSTITUTION], conceptual fact (1) allows her to understand that social facts about 
what was said and done in legal institutions (legislation, judgments etc.) determine legal 
facts in a system; that there is a relationship between social facts and legal facts. 
However, this does not go far enough. Greenberg’s challenge is not just that there is a 
relationship between social facts and legal facts, but that the relationship is reason-
based and thus intelligible to rational agents. At this point, we turn to the Planning 
Theory of Meta-Interpretation for answers. 
It is here that I hope to build on Plunkett’s reply to Greenberg. In his reply, 
Plunkett persuasively demonstrated that conceptual facts (in particular those conceptual 
facts described by the Planning Theory) are in principle capable of fulfilling the 
intelligibility-enabling, reason-providing role that Greenberg sees as crucial among the 
determinants of law. However, as he acknowledges himself,41 his argument takes on an 
abstract focus as a proposed positivist route of how an appeal to conceptual facts might 
meet Greenberg’s challenge given the sorts of facts he thinks conceptual facts are 
(which I have gratefully adopted).42 For example, Plunkett’s argument goes so far as to 
show that conceptual facts are capable of making intelligible the facts that are needed 
to meet the rational-relation requirement, such as that ‘creatures like us, using the legal 
concepts that we have, can understand the fact that certain social facts ground legal 
content’,43 but he does not go further to identify which facts are made intelligible by 
conceptual facts, and how those facts provide reasons for one set of legal facts over 
another. In other words, what Plunkett does is to lay crucial philosophical groundwork 
about the nature of conceptual facts and how they are the kind of intelligibility-enabling 
facts that a positivist might appeal to to meet the rational-relation doctrine, but he does 
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not go further to demonstrate the process of extrapolating from a specific set of social 
facts to legal facts by appealing to conceptual facts. 
In this paper, however, I hope to push further down his proposed route and 
demonstrate, at the ground level, how exactly the conceptual facts delivered to us by 
the Planning Theory enable an individual legal reasoner (Dorothy, whom we will meet 
later) to derive a determinate set of legal facts from social facts in an intelligible, reason-
based way without appeal to value facts. The reason I think this demonstration is helpful 
is that part of the persuasiveness of Greenberg’s account of how facts make law is its 
intuitive appeal – that it accords with and explains our everyday experiences of legal 
practice and reasoning. In fact, I believe this is a good reason to accept the rational-
relation doctrine. However, if it can be demonstrated that an appeal to conceptual facts, 
rather than value facts, in satisfying the rational-relation doctrine can equally explain 
our everyday experiences of legal practice and reasoning, then the rational-relation 
doctrine is no longer a reason to prefer antipositivism to positivism.  
My thesis is that the Planning Theory of Meta-Interpretation allows us to explain 
those everyday experiences, once it is understood not just as a framework for 
adjudicating between different interpretive methodologies, but as a framework for 
adjudicating between different ways of determining legal facts from social facts.  
Although Shapiro was aware of Greenberg’s challenge when he wrote Legality,44 it is 
not made explicit there how exactly his constitutive account of law meets Greenberg’s 
rational-relation doctrine. My aim is to make explicit what appears to be implicit in 
Shapiro’s work by reframing the Planning Theory of Meta-Interpretation to meet 
Greenberg’s challenge. 
4. Lessons from Meta-Interpretation 
Meta-Interpretation answers the question of how to choose an interpretive methodology 
for a piece of text, or in the case of law, statute. Turning to Meta-Interpretation is 
instructive because both Shapiro and Greenberg see a connection between the questions 
‘how should we choose an interpretive methodology for statutes?’ and ‘how should we 
determine legal facts from social facts?’ 
Shapiro gives the example of a constitutional disagreement over how to interpret 
the Eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution:  
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What determines the content of the Eighth Amendment: plain meaning or 
original intent (or perhaps something else)? And it is here that the debate 
between legal positivists and natural lawyers becomes relevant. For the only 
way to figure out whether plain meaning or original intent determines United 
States constitutional law is to know which facts ultimately determine the content 
of all law.45  
For Shapiro, the issue of choosing an interpretive methodology is exactly the 
kind of issue that we are grappling with: how to extrapolate legal facts from social facts. 
Greenberg makes the same observation about the similarity between the 
exercise of choosing between interpretive methodologies and the exercise of choosing 
between possible sets of legal facts from a certain set of determinant facts: 
A model is the counterpart at the metaphysical level of a method of 
interpretation at the epistemic level. (A model’s being correct in a given legal 
system is what makes the corresponding theory of interpretation true.)46 
For Greenberg, the answer to the question of how to choose an interpretive 
methodology follows from the answer to the question of how to choose between 
candidate ways of determining legal facts from social facts (hereafter I will adopt 
Greenberg’s term ‘models’ to refer to these candidate ways). To put it another way, 
how one account of law answers the question ‘which interpretive methodology is 
correct?’ is the same way it answers ‘how do social facts rationally determine legal 
facts?’. If legal positivists are right, then to choose an interpretive methodology one 
must undertake empirical inquiry about what people said and did in certain instances to 
derive support for one interpretive methodology over another. If natural lawyers are 
right, then the only way to choose an interpretive methodology is to engage in moral 
and political philosophy to show that considerations of fairness or democracy, for 
example, support one interpretive methodology over another.47 
Therefore, given the connection between models and interpretive 
methodologies, examining how the Planning Theory determines questions of which 
interpretive methodology to adopt will provide the clearest answer as to how the 
Planning Theory satisfies (or attempts to satisfy) the rational-relation doctrine.  
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5. The Planning Theory of Meta-Interpretation 
As mentioned, one implication of seeing laws as plans is that laws are tools designed to 
achieve certain ends or goals: ‘Legal activity also seeks to accomplish the same basic 
goals that ordinary, garden-variety planning does, namely, to guide, organize, and 
monitor the behaviour of individuals and groups.’48 This applies at the level of an entire 
legal system. A legal system is a planning system designed to achieve numerous and 
complex moral or political ends.49 Further, these ends are too complex for a single 
individual to achieve, so the plans of a legal system aim to guide and organise behaviour 
across time and between persons, often many different persons. In doing so, the legal 
system assigns roles to various actors; some are plan-creators such as legislators and 
some are plan-appliers such as law enforcement agencies and judges (although common 
law judges would be both plan-creators and plan-appliers). These roles are often 
expressed through legislation, with instructions on how to carry out those roles and for 
what end, for example: ‘A Constitutional Court shall be created consisting of six 
Supreme Court Justices who are charged with upholding the Constitution and in such 
matters their judgment shall be supreme.’ Such instructions make up the master plan of 
a system. 
How the master plan is formulated will indicate how much trust is to be assigned 
to different actors in furthering their objectives. In general, the more detailed the 
instructions given, and therefore the less discretion, the less trust is seen to be given to 
that actor. Correspondingly, the more discretion afforded to an actor, the more trust is 
seen to be placed in him. Such judgements of trust and distrust make up what Shapiro 
calls the ‘economy of trust’.50 Since the ends of a legal system are numerous and 
complex and can only be achieved by many individuals playing different roles, one of 
the key functions of plans is to manage this economy of trust.51 
This is important in the context of meta-interpretation because Shapiro argues 
that questions of meta-interpretation cannot be resolved a priori. Questions of 
appropriate interpretive methodology (textualism vs purposivism, etc.) can only be 
resolved by reference to the economy of trust presupposed by the actual legal system in 
question.52 An interpretive methodology that requires a high degree of discretion is 
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appropriate for a legal system that affords its actors a great amount of trust, but 
inappropriate in a legal system that is miserly in its judgements of trust. 
We can illustrate this interplay between judgements of trust and interpretive 
methodologies with a simple, non-legal example. Andrea is a chief engineer in a nuclear 
plant. Once a month she calls one of her senior engineers, Brie, and assigns her the task 
of checking the centrifuges in the plant. Now because she is a senior engineer with 
many years of experience, Andrea’s instructions can be as general as ‘go make sure the 
centrifuges are okay.’ This is because Andrea places a high level of trust in Brie. 
Suppose Brie is replaced by a younger employee, Camille, fresh out of 
university. When it is Camille’s turn to check the centrifuges, because she is much less 
experienced, Andrea gives her much more detailed instructions on how to check the 
centrifuges. Andrea writes down exactly what ranges of levels are acceptable, exactly 
what temperature each centrifuge must be at, and the exact steps that Camille must take 
to check all the centrifuges. This is because Andrea places a lower level of trust in 
Camille. 
Now suppose Camille approaches you asking how she should interpret the 
instructions given to her by Andrea. Should she adopt a literal, textualist interpretation, 
being faithful to every digit of the instructions? Or should she take a purposive 
approach? Suppose you have not looked at the instructions yet. Does it make sense to 
tell Camille that because the point of the plan is to achieve a certain end, that is, that 
the centrifuges are checked, she should always interpret the plan in light of that end? 
Of course not, because that would miss the point of the question. Camille does not know 
how to check the centrifuges. Further, once you have looked at the instructions, you 
realise that the economy of trust underlying the plan is one where Camille is afforded 
little trust, and it is the plan that is intended to settle all questions on how to achieve its 
purpose. Thus, the appropriate methodology is not purposive, but literalist, because to 
do otherwise would frustrate the economy of trust presupposed by the plan. 
The principle illustrated is this: the question of which interpretive methodology 
to adopt is to be answered according to the objectives of the legal system set by its 
planners and in light of their judgements of trust and distrust on various actors in 
furthering those objectives.53 To determine what the proper interpretive methodology 
is, we first ascertain the economy of trust presupposed by the system in light of its 
                                                          
53 ibid 370. 
Laws, Plans and Intelligibility: Defending Legal Positivism 
41 
objectives. This involves looking at the plans of the system to ascertain its judgements 
on different actors and thus the measure of trust afforded to them. Shapiro calls this 
‘extraction’.54 Then, we rank interpretive methodologies according to how well those 
extracted objectives are served if the interpretive methodology in question is followed 
by the relevant actors. This means that interpretive methodologies that afford a high 
amount of discretion to those actors to whom the system attributes a low amount of 
trust are unlikely to serve those objectives very well. Correspondingly, interpretive 
methodologies that afford a low amount of discretion to those actors are likely to serve 
those objectives much better. The interpretive methodology that best furthers those 
objectives is the correct one. If there is a tie between two, then both interpretive 
methodologies are correct, and the law is indeterminate at those points.55 
Note that this does not mean that one interpretive methodology will apply across 
an entire legal system. In a single legal system there may be some areas where the 
system attributes a greater amount of trust to certain actors (judges, civil servants etc.) 
and others where the system attributes a lower amount of trust to those same actors. 
The meta-interpreter must decide the level of generality at which she is to conduct her 
meta-interpretive exercise.56 
Of course, this is a very crude version of the Planning Theory of Meta-
Interpretation. The principle I have stated thus far only discriminates between 
interpretive methodologies of varying degrees of discretion, but not types, and therefore 
does not yield unique answers given the rich variety of interpretive methodologies 
available. Shapiro develops a more sophisticated version in Legality, but this crude 
version suffices for our purposes. Our aim is to see how the Planning Theory’s approach 
to Meta-Interpretation gives insight into how it could answer Greenberg’s challenge. 
6. Satisfying the Rational-Relation Doctrine 
Both Shapiro and Greenberg see a connection between choosing from candidate ways 
that social facts determine legal facts and choosing between different interpretive 
methodologies to adopt when interpreting sources of law. Both exercises involve 
discriminating between different ways of determining legal facts from a given set of 
social facts. 
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What was the Planning Theory’s approach to Meta-Interpretation? The 
interpretive methodology that best serves the objectives of the system in light of its 
presupposed economy of trust is the correct one. What sorts of facts does this involve? 
Social facts. According to Shapiro: 
That some set of goals and values represents the purposes of a certain legal 
system is a fact about certain social groups that is ascertainable by empirical, 
rather than moral, reasoning … This account of legal interpretation is 
positivistic in the most important sense, namely, it roots interpretive 
methodology in social facts. That a legal system has a certain ideology is a fact 
about the behaviour and attitudes of social groups.57 
Therefore, the Planning Theory discriminates between candidate ways of 
determining legal facts from social facts by appealing to further social facts, in 
particular, facts about the attitudes of the system’s planners. This immediately raises a 
problem. Have we not already granted the inability of social facts to explain the reason-
based relationship between social and legal facts? How can we appeal to more social 
facts? 
The problem disappears when we become clear on which facts are actually 
doing the intelligibility-enabling in the process of extrapolating legal facts. We can see 
this clearly when we consider how the legal reasoning process works from the 
perspective of a hypothetical legal reasoner, Dorothy. 
 Suppose Dorothy wants to know what the correct answer is to a question of 
contract law in her legal system. For argument’s sake, let us say the question is whether 
the law permits the use of extrinsic material to determine the meaning of contractual 
clauses. She has on her table a whole mass of social facts such as (as a representative 
sample) what was said and done by parliamentarians and judges, the annual mean 
historical rainfall levels in her country for the past 100 years and the slogans chanted 
by protestors that marched past her home last month. However, she has no idea (yet) 
whether and how any of them are relevant to determining the question of contract law. 
Nevertheless, she knows that she is here to determine what the law is, and so 
she must appeal to her concepts about law, in this case, the conceptual facts about legal 
institutions and legal facts accessible to her through the Planning Theory. She appeals 
to conceptual fact (3): that legal facts are positive, purposive entities that aim to settle 
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deliberative questions about what is to be done and so guide conduct over time to 
achieve goals set by the system’s planners.  
This enables her to do two things. First, she correctly identifies that what was 
said and done by parliamentarians and judges is relevant to determining the law, but 
not her country’s historical weather data or last month’s street protestors. Second, she 
understands that within the relevant social facts there are two sub-groups of social facts. 
The first sub-group of social facts, Social Facts X, are facts about the attitudes 
of the system’s planners regarding the objectives of the system and its economy of trust. 
The second sub-group of social facts, Social Facts Y, are facts about what was said and 
done in the planning process. Conceptual fact (3) tells her that these two groups of 
social facts stand in a certain relationship with each other in determining legal facts, 
which is that Social Facts Y must determine legal facts (in this case a question of 
contract law) by reference to Social Facts X. 
 At this point we should pause to note what has transpired. Appealing to 
conceptual fact (3) has enabled Dorothy to identify which social facts are relevant and 
which are not to determining legal facts. Conceptual fact (3) has also revealed to 
Dorothy that the relationship between social facts and legal facts is reason-based, i.e 
that the relationship between Social Facts Y and the legal facts to be determined is 
reason-based, and that those reasons must be provided by Social Facts X. However, she 
does not yet know what those reasons are. In other words, there is a higher-order 
intelligibility enabled here, which points out the relevance of certain social facts and 
not others to determining legal facts, but not (yet) the lower-order intelligibility of 
identifying the reasons why those social facts result in one set of legal facts and not 
another. 
Greenberg draws attention to this distinction when arguing that value facts 
enable intelligibility, but he elides these two levels of intelligibility: 
By contrast, value facts are well suited to determining the relevance of law 
practices, for value facts include facts about the relevance of descriptive facts. 
For example, that democracy supports an intentionalist model of statutes is, if 
true, a value fact. What about the relevance of the value facts themselves? At 
least in the case of the all-things-considered truth about the relevant values, its 
relevance is intelligible without further reasons. If the all-things-considered 
truth about the relevant considerations supports a certain model of the law 
practices, there can be no serious question of whether that truth is itself relevant, 
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or in what way. The significance for the law of the fact that a certain model is 
all-things-considered better than others is simply the fact that that model is 
better than others.58 
In other words, Greenberg believes that in the case of value facts, the higher-
order intelligibility (the relevance of value facts themselves) is self-evident. We need 
not question his claim at this point, we simply need to note the two levels of 
intelligibility involved in his account, because our appeal to conceptual facts differs in 
this respect. The higher-order intelligibility enabled by conceptual fact (3) answers 
Greenberg’s objection to the extent that he claims positivists cannot determine the 
relevance of some social facts as opposed to others in determining legal facts. What 
remains to be shown is the lower-order intelligibility, that is, the reasons provided by 
those relevant social facts to prefer one candidate way of determining legal facts over 
others. 
 Returning to Dorothy, conceptual fact (3) has helped her to identify the relevant 
social facts, and that determining legal facts from those relevant social facts must be 
done by reference to two sub-groups of social facts, Social Facts X and Social Facts Y, 
such that out of all the possible methods of determining legal facts from Social Facts 
Y, the method that is best justified according to Social Facts X is the legally correct 
method. 
How, then, do Social Facts X provide reasons for favouring one model of 
extrapolating legal facts over another? In order for these facts to provide reasons, they 
must be the sort of facts that are capable of providing reasons the way that value facts 
do in Greenberg’s account; that is, Social Facts X must not only provide the relevant 
considerations being served (eg democracy), but the relevance of certain practices in 
relation to serving those considerations (eg an intentionalist model of statutes). It is 
only then that Social Facts X can provide reasons for favouring a certain model over 
others, in the same way that ‘democracy supports an intentionalist model of statutes’ 
does. 
Recall that Social Facts X are facts about the attitudes of the system planners 
regarding the objectives of the system and its intended methods of achieving those 
objectives (ie the economy of trust). How do these facts provide reasons for preferring 
one set of legal facts over others?  
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Again, by consulting conceptual fact (3), Dorothy understands that Social Facts 
X are facts about the objectives of a legal system and its intended methods of achieving 
those objectives (ie the economy of trust) from the perspective of the system’s planners. 
For example, it could be that, from the perspective of the system’s planners, the aim of 
the law is to foster and facilitate economic activity, and therefore rigid contractual rules 
that promote certainty serve that purpose. Social Facts X thus provide not only the 
relevant considerations (the maximisation of economic activity), but also the means of 
serving those considerations (rigid contractual rules that promote certainty). They 
therefore serve the same function as value facts in providing reasons for favouring one 
model over another. 
Dorothy now has everything she needs to extrapolate the correct set of legal 
facts from Social Facts Y. The correct set of legal facts to extrapolate from Social Facts 
Y is just the set of legal facts that are best justified according to Social Facts X – the 
objectives of the legal system and its intended methods of achieving those objectives. 
To put it in terms of her example, the answer to the question of whether the law permits 
the use of extrinsic materials in interpreting contracts (the legal fact) is determined 
according to the model of extrapolation from what was said and done by 
parliamentarians and judges (Social Facts Y) that best accords with the system’s 
planners’ view that the maximisation of economic activity is best served by rigid 
contractual rules that promote certainty (Social Facts X). What the legally correct 
answer is will depend on the specifics of Social Facts Y which I have left unspecified 
in the example, but the point here is that Dorothy now has the resources she needs to 
determine the legally correct model. Both higher-order and lower-order intelligibility 
are thus enabled by reference to conceptual fact (3) and the rational-relation doctrine is 
satisfied. 
 
D. TWO OBJECTIONS 
In this section I address two possible objections to my response to Greenberg’s 
challenge. These are not the only possible objections, but brevity precludes a wider 
survey. 
1. Conceptual Facts Are Grounded in Social Facts 
One objection arises from the view of conceptual analysis that I have stated above. That 
is, if conceptual analysis involves examining our word usage, it seems likely that 
conceptual facts are made up of nothing more than social facts about our word usage or 
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our dispositions to use certain words under certain conditions. Therefore, we have 
simply returned to the same problem: social facts are once again being used to 
determine their own relevance. Plunkett addresses this objection in his Reply: 
Recall Greenberg’s argument that social practices cannot determine their own 
relevance. Because of this argument, one might want to argue that views of 
concepts as complex facts about dispositions will not work for the positivist in 
responding to the argument in How Facts Make Law. In short, the argument 
here would be that since social facts (such as facts about dispositions) cannot 
“determine their own relevance,” it follows that conceptual facts that are 
equivalent to facts about dispositions cannot help explain the relevance of legal 
practices to legal facts.59 
As a preliminary point, it may not necessarily be the case that concepts are 
metaphysically reducible to social facts about our word usage just because we discover 
our concepts by studying our word-usage. In other words, just because epistemic access 
to conceptual facts is only available through an examination of social facts, it does not 
necessarily follow that conceptual facts are thereby metaphysically constituted by 
social facts. 
Nevertheless, given the close connection between studies of word usage and 
conceptual analysis in my argument, it is at least reasonable to hold such a view of 
conceptual facts, and so for the sake of argument I will grant the point that conceptual 
facts are indeed metaphysically constituted by social facts. 
The initial response to this objection is that it does not stick insofar as it makes 
the more specific claim that certain social facts cannot determine their own relevance 
to legal facts. Greenberg’s argument is sometimes framed this way: that law practices 
themselves cannot adjudicate between ways in which those practices contribute to the 
law.60 If that is the objection, then the Planning Theory’s model of meeting the rational-
relation doctrine above has parried it, for there are in fact two sub-groups of social facts: 
Social Facts X, being the dispositions of the system’s planners towards the objectives 
of the system and the means of achieving them, and Social Facts Y, being social facts 
about what was said and done in the planning process ie law practices. Social Facts Y 
do not determine their own relevance to legal facts. Instead, Social Facts X provide 
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independent standards which determine the relevance of Social Facts Y. Plunkett makes 
this point in his Reply: 
More broadly, we can distinguish between the following two claims: (1) there 
are certain social facts that both (a) ground legal facts, and (b) determine the 
relevance of those social facts; versus (2) there is a set of social facts that (a) 
ground the legal facts, and another set of social facts that (b) make it that those 
token social facts are relevant to constituting the legal facts. It is not clear to me 
why proponents of conceptual facts who see them as grounded in social facts 
need be committed to the first schema. Put together, this means that Greenberg’s 
argument that legal practices cannot determine their own relevance is not 
sufficient by itself to establish that appealing to conceptual facts (where, in turn, 
one understands concepts in terms of dispositions) undermines one’s ability to 
develop an effective response to the argument in How Facts Make Law.61  
However, a counter-response arises – we may have avoided the specific framing 
of Greenberg’s objection, but not the wider-framed objection that social facts alone 
cannot determine the relevance of any or any other social facts to legal facts. That is to 
say that if the relevance of Social Facts X and Y to legal facts is determined by 
conceptual facts, and conceptual facts are in turn determined by further social facts 
about word usage (‘Social Facts Z’) then we have simply pushed the problem further 
back. What determines the relevance of Social Facts Z?  
Recall that the rational-relation doctrine does not preclude the reliance on social 
facts in all relationships of determination, but rather in relationships of rational 
determination.62 That social facts are normatively inert is a problem where the 
relationship of determination is reason-based. On the other hand, if the relationship of 
determination is not reason-based but brute metaphysical, then it does not matter 
whether social facts are normatively inert. For example, it is not a problem for a chemist 
seeking to give a constitutive account of water that the determinant fact of water, a 
chemical composition of H2O, is normatively inert. He does not need to provide reasons 
why H2O is water. It simply is without further reasons. On the other hand, it is a problem 
for a positivist seeking to give a constitutive account of law that its determinant facts, 
social facts, are normatively inert, because the relationship of determination is reason-
based, and social facts, being normatively inert, cannot provide those reasons. 
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With this in mind, it is not clear that the relationship between conceptual facts 
and its determinant Social Facts Z is reason-based, as opposed to brute metaphysical. 
If concepts are the constituent component of our thoughts that words express, and the 
content of a concept is determined by the set of conditions under which we use certain 
words, then it is reasonable to think that the relationship between Social Facts Z, social 
facts about our word usage, and conceptual facts is simply brute metaphysical. That is 
to say conceptual facts obtain as long as enough people use a word enough times in 
specific conditions. If this is true, then the fact that Social Facts Z are normatively inert 
is not a problem for the legal positivist who appeals to conceptual facts. Social Facts Z 
simply determine conceptual facts without further reasons. 
2. Extraction requires value facts 
Another objection may be raised that there are some value facts secretly doing the work 
in the process of extraction. Recall that the Planning Theory of Meta-Interpretation 
requires one to determine the objectives and the economy of trust of a legal system by 
interpreting social facts, including the institutional history of the system. The objection 
might be levelled that there is some value fact doing the work here – why are social 
facts about the dispositions of the system’s planners relevant to determining what the 
law is now? This objection is understandable given that the Planning Theory of Meta-
Interpretation bears resemblance to antipositivist interpretivist theories. For 
interpretivists, the institutional history of a system is relevant to determining present 
legal facts because of the moral concern arising from the fact of state coercion.63 
Therefore, the objection is that unless the positivist is able to provide an account of why 
the institutional history of a system is relevant without appealing to value facts (which 
would seem to be a natural fit) the Planning Theorist is probably secretly relying on 
some value facts to do the work.  
 The solution is to once again appeal to conceptual fact (3). If laws are plans or 
plan-like norms whose function is to guide and organise the conduct of members of a 
community over time and across persons, then it is a matter of conceptual necessity that 
the question of what the plan is must be determined in accordance with the attitudes 
and dispositions of the system’s planners in the first place. In other words, it is inherent 
in the concept of a plan that one looks backwards to the institutional history of the 
planning process to determine how the plan was intended to guide and organise conduct 
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in any given situation. Therefore, to the extent that one appeals to value facts to 
determine what the law is, one commits a conceptual error. The Planning Theory 
therefore has a plausible account of the relevance of institutional history to the 
determination of legal facts without appeal to value facts and so the objection is met, at 
least to the extent that our response to the first objection about the nature of conceptual 
facts holds. 
  A follow-up criticism might then be raised that, even if institutional history is 
relevant by virtue of conceptual facts, extraction nevertheless seems to require 
reasoning about value facts – specifically, the dispositions of the system’s planners 
towards the values of the system. To respond to this criticism, it’s helpful to explain 
how Shapiro understands this process of determining the objectives and economy of 
trust underlying a legal system: 
Extraction… is essentially an explanatory process. The meta-interpreter 
attempts to show that a system’s particular institutional structure is due, in part, 
to the fact that those who designed it had certain views about the trustworthiness 
of the actors in question and therefore entrusted actors with certain rights and 
responsibilities.64 
Therefore, in extraction, one is determining what kind of values the system’s 
planners must have in order to explain their influence on the institutional structure of 
the system. Undoubtedly, this involves inquiry about value, but it does not follow that 
such explanations are only possible by reference to genuine value facts. To return to 
my earlier example, Dorothy need not have any particular attitude towards wealth-
maximisation for her to determine that the system’s designers aimed at wealth-
maximisation. Of course, she needs to already know what wealth-maximisation is in 
order to identify it as an objective of the system, but it does not follow that she is thereby 
appealing to a genuine value fact. Wealth-maximisation, to her, may simply be a 
concept, rather than a value fact. Similarly, one need not treat Aryan superiority as a 
value fact in order to determine that the Third Reich aimed at Aryan superiority; one 
need only consult the concept of Aryan superiority in order to arrive at that explanation. 
Value facts are unnecessary in the inquiry.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
I have demonstrated above through Shapiro’s Planning Theory, and specifically the 
Planning Theory of Meta-Interpretation, that conceptual facts are capable of satisfying 
the rational-relation doctrine, and that therefore positivism is able to meet Greenberg’s 
challenge in How Facts Make Law.  
It is interesting to note the broad structure of Greenberg’s challenge – it begins 
from an account of legal reasoning and ends with conclusions about the nature of law 
that are inconsistent with legal positivism. What this reveals is that the metaphysical 
question of the nature of law is deeply connected to the epistemological question of 
how we as rational beings know what the law is. Therefore, it seems that any 
constitutive account of the nature of law must also provide a plausible account of legal 
reasoning.65 Though it remains to be seen whether an appeal to conceptual facts 
withstands further scrutiny, I would tentatively conclude that conceptual facts can play 
a crucial role in a positivist account of legal reasoning – one that can equally 
accommodate our intuitions about legal practice and what legal reasoning entails. 
The rational-relation doctrine also throws light onto an interesting relationship 
between the intelligibility of law and the normativity of law, in that the way one 
accounts for the former has implications for the way one accounts for the latter. If, as 
Greenberg suggests, the correct model of determining legal facts is the one that best 
accords with independently true value facts (eg democracy favours an intentionalist 
model of statutes) then the fact that a proposition has been determined to be legally 
correct itself provides reasons for action for the individual legal reasoner.66  
On the other hand, if the correct model of determining legal facts is the one that 
best accords with the system’s planners’ views on the objectives of the system and the 
intended means of achieving those objectives, then determining the correct set of legal 
facts does not, without more, provide reasons for action. In other words, just because 
Dorothy has settled the question of what the law is does not settle the question of what 
she should do. Instead, the law only provides reasons for action from a certain 
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perspective, that is, the perspective of the system’s planners. This is what Shapiro calls 
‘the legal point of view’: 
According to the Planning Theory of law, to say that X is legally obligated to 
do A (where “legal” is used perspectivally) is to say that from the legal point of 
view, X is obligated to do A. The legal point of view purports to represent the 
moral point of view. It states that the norms of the legal system are morally 
legitimate and binding. Since norms of the legal system are plans, the legal point 
of view claims that the plans of the system are morally legitimate and binding.67 
This would situate the debate about the intelligibility of law within the wider inquiry 
into the normativity of law. If it is true that one must appeal to value facts to even 
determine what the law is, then it is difficult for the positivist to maintain that the 
existence of a legal fact is independent of the merits of its content, and therefore that 
legal obligations do not necessarily track genuine moral obligations. Greenberg’s 
challenge therefore reveals a bridge not only across epistemology and metaphysics, but 
also metanormative theory, one that might prove fruitful for attempts to integrate 
various questions in analytical jurisprudence. 
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